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1 
MIXING OIL AND WATER: THE ROLE OF 
NATURAL RESOURCE WEALTH IN THE 
RESOLUTION OF THE MARITIME 
BOUNDARY DISPUTE  BETWEEN  
GHANA AND CÔTE D’IVOIRE 
NATALIE CAPPELLAZZO* 
Abstract: The West African nations of Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire are deeply 
entrenched in a legal battle over where in the Atlantic Ocean to draw the 
maritime boundary between them. Further complicating the conflict is the 
presence of significant quantities of offshore petroleum in the disputed area.  
In an interim order issued on April 25, 2015, a Special Chamber of the In-
ternational Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ruled that Ghana may proceed 
with existing oil-related activity but must take all steps necessary to prevent 
new drilling, ensure that no information derived from oil exploration be 
used to the detriment of Côte D’Ivoire, and strictly monitor all activity in 
the disputed area. While a final decision on the merits with regard to the 
maritime boundary is not expected until 2017, the order suggests that Gha-
na’s extensive exploration of the area and reliance on the anticipated oil 
income will play a role in the outcome of the case. This raises the broader 
question of whether the presence of natural resource wealth and its potential 
to facilitate economic development should be a relevant consideration in the 
adjudication of cross-border disputes on a global scale. 
INTRODUCTION 
A $4.9 billion offshore oil project has the capacity to bring eagerly 
awaited economic stability to the West African country of Ghana.1 The en-
deavor appears to be a win-win situation for both Ghana and Tullow, the 
British firm at the helm of developing the “TEN” field off of the western 
coast of Africa.2 Although drilling has already begun and production is ex-
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 1 See Michael Hogan & Matthew Mpoke Bigg, Ghana Can Continue Development in Ivory 
Coast Oil Dispute: Tribunal, REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/25/
us-ghana-ivorycoast-oil-idUSKBN0NG0IX20150425 [https://perma.cc/Y849-LLKP]. 
 2 See id. “TEN” stands for the Tweneboa-Enyenra-Ntomme field. See Andreas Exarheas, 
Perfect TEN for Tullow in Ghana, RIGZONE (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_
gas/a/141209/Perfect_TEN_for_Tullow_in_Ghana [https://perma.cc/JP74-AN4Y]. 
2 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 39:E. Supp. 
pected to begin during the summer of 2016, the project—along with the antic-
ipated financial windfall for the developing African nation—has been com-
promised in light of a maritime boundary dispute with neighboring Côte 
D’Ivoire.3 
During the colonial era, the colonizing powers drew the international 
boundary lines that the West African countries ultimately inherited upon 
gaining political independence, paying far greater attention to the determi-
nation of land boundaries than maritime boundaries.4 The two African coun-
tries similarly showed little urgency in delimitating the boundary line follow-
ing independence, but this changed upon the discovery and subsequent explo-
ration of offshore petroleum resources in the now-disputed area.5 The ongo-
ing territorial dispute most recently culminated in an order from the Special 
Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), 
which—without ruling on the merits of the dispute itself—stated that Ghana 
can continue to develop the offshore oil project throughout the ongoing pro-
ceedings but may not undertake any additional drilling.6 Although a ruling 
on the merits is not expected until 2017, the order signifies an important 
step in furtherance of the project, which is expected to ultimately yield up to 
80,000 barrels of oil per day for Ghana.7 
Part 1 of this Comment provides background on the facts of the 
boundary dispute, specifically in the context of the procedural history of the 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See id.; Press Release, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Dispute Concerning De-
limitation of the Maritime Boundary Between the Republic of Ghana and the Republic of Côte 
D’Ivoire Submitted to a Special Chamber of the Tribunal, ITLOS/Press 222 (Jan. 12, 2015), https://
www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/press_releases_english/PR_222_EN.pdf [https://perma.
cc/W94D-YK4R]; Tullow: TEN Project Over 80% Complete, CAPEX Reduction in 2016, RIGZONE 
(Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/142464/Tullow_TEN_Project_Over_80_
Complete_CAPEX_Reduction_in_2016 [https://perma.cc/F4AS-EN5T]. 
 4 Raymond Bagulo Bening, The Ghana-La Côte D’Ivoire Maritime Boundary Dispute, 6 
GHANA J. GEOGRAPHY 81, 82 (2014). 
 5 See id. 
 6 See Press Release, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Dispute Concerning De-
limitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean 
(Ghana/Côte D’Ivoire): Special Chamber Prescribes Provisional Measures, ITLOS/Press 229 
(Apr. 25, 2015), https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/press_releases_english/PR_229_
EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y56Z-X9B4]. 
 7 Michael Kavanagh, Tribunal Orders Ghana to Suspend New Drilling in Ivory Coast Dispute, 
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/05860c4a-eb6f-11e4-9058-00144feab7de.
html [https://perma.cc/4W3X-RLCB]. Ghana’s oil industry is relatively young. See GRAIL RE-
SEARCH, FUELLING GHANA’S GROWTH: OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 7 (2015), http://www.integreon.
com/PDF/Ghana-Oil-And-Gas-Industry.pdf [https://perma.cc/WS9G-UCBH]. The first offshore oil 
production and exploration licenses were only granted in 2004 with production officially commenc-
ing in 2007. Id. In 2012, Ghana’s oil industry in its entirety produced 80,000 barrels per day; this 
figure rose to 99,000 barrels per day in 2013. Id. at 5. Thus, the anticipated 80,000 barrels per day 
from the TEN field alone would account for a significant increase in overall industry production. See 
id. at 23.  
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legal proceedings of the Special Chamber of the ITLOS. Part II of this 
Comment discusses the parties’ contentions, and the subsequent order set 
forth by the Special Chamber. Part III examines the boundary dispute within 
the larger framework of cross-border disputes and economic development—
specifically highlighting the notion that although there are a number of po-
tential ways the case may be resolved, Ghana’s extensive exploration of the 
disputed area and reliance on the anticipated oil windfalls will play a role in 
the final outcome. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On September 19, 2014, arbitral proceedings between the Republic of 
Ghana and the Republic of Côte D’Ivoire commenced under Annex VII of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).8 Subse-
quently, the two parties formed a Special Agreement to submit the maritime 
boundary dispute to a special chamber of ITLOS.9 On January 12, 2015, 
ITLOS granted the request to form a special chamber and on February 27, 
2015, received a request for the prescription of provisional measures (Re-
quest) from Côte D’Ivoire pursuant to Article 290 of UNCLOS.10 Under 
UNCLOS, once a court or tribunal establishes that it has jurisdiction over a 
dispute, it may prescribe any provisional measures consistent with the goals 
of preserving the rights of the parties to the dispute and protecting the mari-
time environment until a final decision is reached.11 This power arises only 
where there is a need to avert a real and imminent risk of irreparable preju-
dice occurring before the delivery of a final decision, which may only be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.12 
The Request submitted by Côte D’Ivoire asked that the Special Cham-
ber prescribe provisional measures that Ghana suspend all exploration and 
exploitation in the disputed area; refrain from granting any new permits that 
allow exploration and exploitation in the disputed area; prevent information 
gathered pursuant to exploration in the disputed area from being used in any 
detrimental way against Côte D’Ivoire; take all steps necessary to preserve 
the continental shelf, its waters, and its subsoil; and abstain from any unilat-
                                                                                                                           
 8 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea Annex VII, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3; Dis-
pute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire in the 
Atlantic Ocean (Ghana v. Côte D’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Order of Apr. 25, 2015, 2 https://
www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_prov_meas/C23_Order_prov.measures
_25.04.2015_orig_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQ7W-MSK9]. 
 9 See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 8;  Ghana v. Côte D’Ivoire, Case 
No. 23, at 2. 
 10 See Ghana v. Côte D’Ivoire, Case No. 23, ¶¶ 1, 5. 
 11 Id. ¶¶ 36–39. 
 12 See id. ¶¶ 42–43. 
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eral activity that would prejudice the rights of Côte D’Ivoire or aggravate 
the dispute.13 In response to the Request, Ghana alleged that although no 
line had been formally delimitated, both countries had observed the mari-
time boundary for decades and that Côte D’Ivoire had made no objection to 
the oil-related activities that Ghana had been carrying out for many years.14 
At this stage in the proceedings, the Special Chamber was not charged 
with resolving the maritime dispute, but rather, it had the task of determin-
ing whether or not to prescribe provisional measures.15 Ultimately, the Spe-
cial Chamber found that the rights that Côte D’Ivoire claimed and sought to 
protect were plausible on the merits and that there was a sufficient link be-
tween the rights and the provisional measures sought.16 
The Special Chamber, however, found that Côte D’Ivoire had not suf-
ficiently demonstrated that Ghanaian oil activity created such an imminent 
risk of irreparable harm to the maritime environment that the only viable 
way to preserve the parties’ rights was to halt completely all unilateral oil-
related activity in the disputed area.17 On the contrary, the Special Chamber 
accepted Ghana’s assertion that shutting down its offshore oil industry 
would have a detrimental environmental effect because production was so 
advanced that stopping it would lead to the degradation of the equipment in 
the waters.18 The Special Chamber also accepted Ghana’s proposition that 
suspension of drilling already in progress would entail such a substantial 
financial loss to Ghana as to prejudice its own rights and impose an undue 
burden.19 
Thus, until a final decision is reached, Ghana may continue to develop 
existing oil-related activity but must also take all steps necessary to prevent 
any new drilling, ensure that no information derived from oil exploration be 
used to the detriment of Côte D’Ivoire, and strictly monitor all activity in 
the disputed area.20 Further, both parties agreed to take all steps necessary 
to protect the marine environment, to refrain from any unilateral activity 
that may aggravate the dispute, and to submit initial reports to the Special 
Chamber by May 25, 2015.21 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Press Release, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Côte D’Ivoire Seeks Provisional 
Measures in the Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and 
Côte D’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte D’Ivoire), ITLOS/Press 224 (Mar. 2, 2015), 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/press_releases_english/PR_224_EN.pdf [https://
perma.cc/B2PW-U335]. 
 14 Ghana v. Côte D’Ivoire, Case No. 23, ¶¶ 52–54. 
 15 See id. ¶¶ 57–58. 
 16 See id. ¶¶ 62–63. 
 17 See id. ¶¶ 67, 99–100. 
 18 See id. ¶ 99. 
 19 See id. ¶ 100. 
 20 See id. ¶ 108. 
 21 See id. 
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II. DISCUSSION 
On February 27, 2015, Côte D’Ivoire submitted its request for the pre-
scription of provisional measures to the Special Chamber pursuant to Arti-
cle 290 of UNCLOS.22 Côte D’Ivoire alleged that despite an absence of an 
agreed-upon maritime boundary, Ghana has acted as though the disputed 
area is its own by granting additional oil contracts, conducting seismic sur-
veys, authorizing drilling, and installing permanent subsea structures in the 
disputed territory.23 In the Request, Côte D’Ivoire contends that provisional 
measures are necessary to ensure adequate protection of its rights pending a 
final decision in the boundary dispute and that the measures are indispensa-
ble in preventing serious harm to the marine environment.24 
Arguing in favor of the prescription of provisional measures, Côte 
D’Ivoire relies on Article 2, Paragraph 2 of UNCLOS, which states that the 
sovereignty of the coastal country extends to the bed and the subsoil of the 
territorial sea.25 Furthermore, Côte D’Ivoire cites Articles 56, Paragraph 1 
and Article 77, Paragraph 1, which both provide that the coastal country has 
sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring and exploiting the natural 
resources of the seabed and its subsoil.26 Côte D’Ivoire contends that in or-
der for a final decision on the merits to be ultimately effective, the Special 
Chamber needs to ensure that its rights are protected in the interim.27 Côte 
D’Ivoire’s position is that the Special Chamber’s prescription is justified 
because the unilateral activity of Ghana in the disputed area constitutes an 
infringement of its sovereign rights.28 
Côte D’Ivoire points to Ghana’s increased drilling and production ac-
tivities as evidence of infringement upon its exploration rights.29 Côte 
D’Ivoire contends that this type of unilateral activity by Ghana prejudices 
Côte D’Ivoire and makes reaching a final agreement more difficult.30 Fur-
thermore, Côte D’Ivoire alleges that it has suffered harm as a result of Gha-
na’s acquisition of information related to the natural resources in the disput-
                                                                                                                           
 22 Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures Submitted by the Republic of Côte 
D’Ivoire under Article 290, Paragraph 1, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
¶ 2, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire 
in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana v. Côte D’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Feb. 27, 2015, https://www.itlos.org/
fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_prov_meas/C23_Request_prov_measures_translation_
Reg.pdf [https://perma.cc/34TC-RK7J]. 
 23 See id. ¶¶ 9–10. 
 24 See id. ¶ 3. 
 25 See id. ¶ 15. 
 26 See id. 
 27 See id. ¶ 16. 
 28 See id. 
 29 See id. ¶ 23. 
 30 See id. 
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ed area.31 It is a generally accepted principle that the sovereign rights of the 
coastal country include the right to possess and control information related 
to the availability, quantity, nature, location, and economic viability of the 
natural resources.32 Côte D’Ivoire contends that Ghana’s possession of such 
information about the resources in the disputed area constitutes irreparable 
harm because if a final decision is rendered in Côte D’Ivoire’s favor, the 
information will have already been circulated, and it will, therefore, be in a 
weakened negotiating position if it wishes to grant oil contracts and reap the 
benefits of the resources in the area.33 Additionally, Côte D’Ivoire points to 
Ghana’s “sketchy” conditions for awarding oil contracts and alleges that the 
companies to which the contracts were awarded lack the necessary technical 
and financial capacity to conduct the extensive operations.34 Finally, Côte 
D’Ivoire cites and notes the significance of Article 290, Paragraph 1 of 
UNCLOS, which explains that provisional measures may be prescribed to 
protect the marine environment.35 Côte D’Ivoire supports its proposition by 
pointing to pollution in the TEN area, the lack of cleanup initiatives, the risk 
of pollution to the shores of Côte D’Ivoire due to westward winds, and the 
potential upset of the ecosystems and wildlife in the area.36 
Ghana submitted a written statement to the Special Chamber on March 
23, 2015, calling Côte D’Ivoire’s request for provisional measures “far-
reaching and unprecedented” and alleging that Côte D’Ivoire is essentially 
trying to shut down significant portions of Ghana’s oil industry despite hav-
ing accepted it for many years.37 According to Ghana, Côte D’Ivoire’s most 
recent position abandons a boundary line that had been previously agreed-
upon for over forty years.38 Ghana also specifically refutes Côte D’Ivoire’s 
contention that its oil operations are being conducted incompetently and 
with a lack of transparency.39 Further, Ghana alleges that Côte D’Ivoire’s 
assertion that Ghana is acting with complete disregard for the marine envi-
ronment has never been raised throughout the long history of the ongoing 
boundary dispute.40 In essence, Ghana takes the position that because Côte 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See id. ¶¶ 30–35. 
 32 See id. ¶ 30. 
 33 See id. ¶¶ 34–35. 
 34 See id. ¶ 40. 
 35 See id. ¶ 46. 
 36 See id. ¶¶ 47, 49–52. 
 37 See Written Statement of Ghana ¶ 2, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime 
Boundary Between Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana v. Côte D’Ivoire), Case 
No. 23, Mar. 23, 2015, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_prov_
meas/Vol._I_-_Written_Statement_of_Ghana_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/RSY7-U8ND] [hereinaf-
ter Written Statement of Ghana]. 
 38 See id. ¶¶ 13–14. 
 39 See id. ¶ 4. 
 40 See id. 
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D’Ivoire previously accepted the current boundary line and because Ghana 
subsequently relied on Côte D’Ivoire’s acceptance of the line and non-
objection to Ghanaian oil activity in the now-disputed area, granting Côte 
D’Ivoire’s request and implementing the provisional measures sought would 
cause Ghana severe, irreparable harm at this stage in the proceedings.41 
Thus, the issue before the Special Chamber was whether or not Côte 
D’Ivoire had demonstrated such a real and imminent risk of irreparable 
harm to its rights that the prescription of provisional measures was warrant-
ed.42 In making its determination, the Special Chamber relied heavily upon 
prior cases in which provisional measures were sought in the midst of an 
international dispute.43 It cited the reasoning of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) in the order pursuant to Certain Activities Carried Out by Nic-
aragua in the Border Area in order to highlight the requisite link between 
the rights that a country is claiming and the provisional measures it seeks.44 
In that case, Nicaraguan troops were occupying an area that was the subject 
of a territorial dispute with Costa Rica over Nicaragua’s right to dredge the 
San Juan River.45 The ICJ found that the rights associated with Costa Rica’s 
claim to sovereignty over the disputed area were plausible.46 Consequently, 
there was a sufficient link between the rights it sought to protect and the 
provisional measures it asked the ICJ to impose—namely prohibiting Nica-
ragua from stationing troops in the disputed territory.47 
The Special Chamber also looked to Articles 192 and 193 of UNCLOS 
in making its determination as to whether Côte D’Ivoire had demonstrated 
that the activities conducted by Ghana in the disputed area constituted an 
“imminent risk of serious harm” to the marine environment, citing the obli-
gation of countries to exercise their exploitation rights in a manner that pro-
tects and preserves the marine environment.48 Ultimately, it found that Côte 
D’Ivoire failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that Ghanaian oil ac-
tivities met this standard and posed such a risk.49 
In finding that Côte D’Ivoire had demonstrated a sufficiently strong link 
between its rights and the measures it sought while also rejecting the conten-
                                                                                                                           
 41 See id. ¶ 14. 
 42 See Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Côte 
D’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana v. Côte D’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Order of Apr. 25, 2015, ¶ 74, 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_prov_meas/C23_Order_prov.
measures_25.04.2015_orig_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQ7W-MSK9]. 
 43 See id. ¶¶ 63, 69, 72–73. 
 44 See id. ¶ 63. 
 45 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), 
Order of Mar. 8, 2011 I.C.J. 6, ¶¶ 4–5. 
 46 See id. ¶¶ 60–61. 
 47 See id. ¶¶ 60–61, 86. 
 48 Ghana v. Côte D’Ivoire, Case No. 23, ¶¶ 67, 69–70. 
 49 Id. ¶ 67. 
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tion that Ghana’s activity posed a severe, urgent threat to the local marine 
environment, the Special Chamber ultimately found a middle ground in ren-
dering the order.50 The Special Chamber prescribed provisionary measures 
but also accepted and explicitly acknowledged Ghana’s assertion that sus-
pending all ongoing drilling-related activities would create a significant risk 
of considerable financial loss and impose an undue burden.51 By granting 
Côte D’Ivoire’s request for the prescription of provisional measures with the 
caveat that Ghana may continue its existing oil-related operations, the Special 
Chamber was able to preserve both countries’ sovereignty while also signal-
ing that the related economic development would not be impeded.52 
III. ANALYSIS 
The order set forth by the Special Chamber on April 25, 2015, by no 
means signifies a final decision on the merits, which is not expected until 
2017.53 Although the order is meant only to preserve the status quo and pro-
tect the rights of both Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire in the interim, it raises im-
portant questions about the final outcome and highlights the tension be-
tween state sovereignty and economic development, which lies at the heart 
of the dispute.54 
Generally speaking, the absence of precisely delimitated boundaries 
hinders development and increases tension among the parties involved, es-
pecially in the context of Africa, where only 30% of African boundaries are 
clearly demarcated.55 Therefore, resolution of boundary disputes—whether 
formally or via settlement—is crucial to utilize effectively the valuable nat-
                                                                                                                           
 50 See id. ¶¶ 62–63, 67, 108. 
 51 See id. ¶¶ 99–100, 108. 
 52 See id. ¶¶ 104, 108; Hogan & Bigg, supra note 1. 
 53 See generally Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana 
and Côte D’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana v. Côte D’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Order of Apr. 25, 
2015, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_prov_meas/C23_Order_
prov.measures_25.04.2015_orig_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQ7W-MSK9] (explaining that the 
order is not meant to prejudge the actual merits of the larger boundary dispute, and that the respec-
tive rights of both states are left unaffected); Kavanagh, supra note 7 (noting that the next phase of 
the dispute is projected to last until 2017). 
 54 See Ghana v. Côte D’Ivoire, Case No. 23, ¶¶ 103–04, 108; Hogan & Bigg, supra note 1. 
 55 OCEAN DATA AND INFO. NETWORK FOR AFR., STATUS REPORT ON AFRICAN MARITIME 
BORDER DISPUTES (2014), http://www.odinafrica.org/news/139-african-maritime-border-disputes.
html [https://perma.cc/HD92-GHJL]. African borders today are largely the same as they were when 
European colonizing powers drew them in the 18th and 19th centuries. See Max Fisher, The Dividing 
of a Continent: Africa’s Separatist Problem, ATLANTIC (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2012/09/the-dividing-of-a-continent-africas-separatist-problem/262171/ [https://
perma.cc/3W87-KENP]. Although national borders in other parts of the world, such as Slovenia and 
Croatia, have shifted to represent more accurately ethnic, linguistic, and religious divisions, many 
African borders still reflect arbitrary colonial-era decisionmaking, sparking numerous conflicts across 
the continent. See id. 
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ural resources and to ensure that their subsequent financial windfalls reach 
the economies that rely on them.56 
A. Potential Options in Resolving the Dispute 
Because UNCLOS does not provide a specific formula for delimitating 
boundaries, there is a wide range of possibilities available to the Special 
Chamber in reaching its final decision on the merits.57 For example, in the 
territorial and maritime dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia, the ICJ 
employed a creative solution using mixed delimitation techniques in order 
to draw a single boundary line among seven different maritime features 
over which both countries claimed sovereignty.58 Although the resulting 
line in that dispute was complex and seemingly unorthodox, the ICJ’s deci-
sion demonstrates the flexibility of adjudicating bodies in reaching fair out-
comes in maritime disputes.59 Under UNCLOS, delimitation should be car-
ried out with the effect of achieving an equitable solution.60 Though courts 
tend to favor an equidistance approach, the lack of a clear definition or 
guidelines as to what constitutes an “equitable solution” gives international 
bodies a considerable amount of leeway in formulating their decisions.61 
Thus, the Special Chamber has the discretion to take the economic circum-
stances of this case into account when making its final decision.62 
The presence of oil may very well affect the determination as to what 
an “equitable solution” represents in the dispute between Ghana and Côte 
D’Ivoire.63 If both countries prefer not to wait for the final decision in 2017, 
it is possible that an alternative agreement may be reached with regards to 
the disputed area.64 For example, the countries could enter into a joint-
development agreement while waiting for a final decision, which would allow 
them to share exclusive rights to the natural resources in the disputed area 
without deviating from their claims.65 Further, joint-development agreements 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See Fisher, supra note 55; Hogan & Bigg, supra note 1. 
 57 See John Donaldson & Alison Williams, Understanding Maritime Jurisdictional Disputes: 
The East China Sea and Beyond, 59 J. INT’L AFF. 135, 141 (2005); Nienke Grossman, Interna-
tional Decisions: Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Columbia), 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 
396, 402 (2013). 
 58 See Grossman, supra note 57, at 396, 402 (describing the ICJ’s use of weighted base 
points, geodetic lines, parallels of latitude, and enclaving to delimit the maritime boundary). 
 59 See id. at 402. 
 60 See Donaldson & Williams, supra note 57, at 141. 
 61 See id. at 142. 
 62 See id. 
 63 See id. 
 64 See Marc Sonntag & Felix Lüth, Who Owns the Arctic? A Stocktaking of Territorial Dis-
putes, GLOBAL J. (Dec. 21, 2011), http://theglobaljournal.net/article/view/439/ [https://perma.cc/
3TMC-PSFL]. 
 65 See id. 
10 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 39:E. Supp. 
do not have to split the rights evenly between both parties; for example, after 
a long dispute between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, the countries decided to 
divide their resources 85:15 in favor of Senegal for oil resources, and 50:50 
for fishing rights.66 This could be a viable solution in the case of Ghana and 
Côte D’Ivoire because rights could be allocated in a manner that would give 
Côte D’Ivoire access to valuable resources while also accounting for the 
fact that the vast majority of oil operations have been conducted by Gha-
na.67 Even a 90:10 split would not be unprecedented.68 On the other hand, 
Ghana may be willing to bide its time and wait for a final decision at the 
cost of stalled oil operations, given its extensive unilateral presence in the 
disputed area and entrance into various contracts with multinational oil 
companies.69 
B. Prior Cases and the Role of Economic Development 
The Special Chamber’s order in the case of Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire 
struck a balance between preserving both countries’ sovereignty by prohibit-
ing new drilling and facilitating continued economic development by allow-
ing Ghana to carry on with its existing oil-related activities in the disputed 
area.70 This raises a larger question with implications for the final decision: 
To what extent does economic development factor into international courts’ 
decision-making when delimiting territorial and maritime boundaries?71 
Currently, the presence of natural resources and their economic value 
in deciding boundary disputes is unclear.72 Circumstantial evidence, how-
ever, points to the conclusion that international adjudicatory bodies are not 
ignorant to these considerations; for example, in the first phase of deciding 
a territorial dispute between Eritrea and Yemen, the tribunal did not refer to 
oil exploration activities in reaching the first-phase award.73 Prior to the 
second-phase award, though, Eritrea argued that its people would be ad-
versely affected if precluded from exercising their traditional fishing rights 
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in the Red Sea.74 In making the second-phase award, the tribunal specifical-
ly recognized a continuing right of Eritrea’s fishermen to fish beyond the 
newly delimitated boundary, right up to Yemen’s shores.75 More recently, 
the ICJ awarded Peru a segment of territory in the Pacific Ocean rich in 
fishing and other natural resources while also allowing Chile to retain 
eighty miles of offshore territory in order to preserve the economic pros-
perity of Chile’s northernmost large city and major fishing port.76 Again, 
this decision points to the ICJ’s awareness of and sensitivity to economic 
circumstances rather than its reliance on a purely geographic method of cal-
culating a fair boundary line.77 
In considering what impact the oil wealth in the disputed area will 
have in the arrival at a final decision, it is also useful to consider past prece-
dent.78 In a case before ITLOS similar to the one involving Ghana and Côte 
D’Ivoire, Bangladesh and Myanmar sought delimitation of their maritime 
boundary after a thirty-eight-year dispute and no possibility of a bilateral 
agreement.79 The tribunal awarded Bangladesh exclusive economic control 
of 111,000 square kilometers in the Bay of Bengal, which is rich in natural 
gas, various types of minerals, and fish.80 Perhaps not coincidentally, Bang-
ladesh had been suffering from a power crisis, and the need for natural gas 
had become a major political issue domestically.81 Again, although it is un-
clear how much formal deference was paid to these concerns within the tri-
bunal’s deliberations, this prior ITLOS case highlights a correlation be-
tween the presence of natural resources and what constitutes an equitable 
resolution to a maritime boundary dispute.82 
CONCLUSION 
Although the role of natural resources in determining final decisions in 
maritime boundary disputes is still unclear, it is apparent that the economic 
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realities of the countries engaged in these disputes are difficult for interna-
tional adjudicating bodies to ignore. In the maritime boundary dispute be-
tween Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire, the associated economic development for 
Ghana is far from speculative in light of its substantial exploitation and 
drilling efforts and entrance into contracts with multinational oil companies. 
Given the magnitude of the financial windfall at stake and Ghana’s re-
liance on its continued oil activities, economic development will be a factor 
in the outcome of the boundary dispute—whether its resolution comes in 
the form of a settlement that allows Ghana to proceed, a joint-development 
agreement, or a final decision on the merits. If the case is ultimately re-
solved in 2017 as anticipated, it is likely that the Special Chamber’s final 
ruling will be structured in a way that takes these circumstances into ac-
count by preserving Ghana’s offshore oil industry and facilitating continued 
economic development. 
